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One of the latter-20th century’s major developments was the emergence of an Asian-Pacific chal-
lenge to the centuries long Eurocentric dominance of global affairs. The product of a complex mixture 
of historical, economic, demographic, and political factors, this process continued apace into the 21st 
century and is central to what is now understood as a changed world order.
Among the first organizations to recognize and promote this transformation in its earlier phases was 
the Institute of Pacific Relations, initially a study and discussion group for influential civic and busi-
ness leaders from throughout the region concerned with developing regional issues. It thrived from its 
founding in 1925 until its collapse in the late 1950s, an unfortunate victim primarily of McCarthyism. 
It pioneered problem-oriented conferences that brought leaders from nearly all nations with Asian-Pa-
cific interests together on a regular basis, drew unprecedented international press attention to the re-
gion, attracted sustained financial support from such philanthropic giants as the Rockefeller Founda-
tion and the Carnegie Endowment for World Peace as well as substantial support from leading 
American, Japanese, and European businesses, and, perhaps most important over the long term, estab-
lished a research and publication program that created much of the foundation underlying modern 
Asian and Pacific academic studies programs. As the late John King Fairbank, a towering 20th century 
figure in Asian studies, once observed, contemporary scholars in the field must be informed about the 
Institute if they are to understand their own academic roots. Others have expressed similar judgments 
with respect to its role in promoting regional diplomatic and intercultural relations.
The Institute’s record of programmatic achievements over its some four decades of activity is the ba-
sis for this remarkable assessment. Following its initial international conference in 1925, it was formal-
ly organized with an international headquarters and staff located first in Honolulu and then in New 
York and regional councils with offices and staff in all the major Asian nations and those elsewhere 
with Asian-Pacific interests. Over time, this came to include Australia, Burma, Canada, China, France, 
Great Britain, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, the 
Soviet Union (briefly), and the United States. Twelve subsequent international conferences were held 
between the first (in Honolulu) in 1925 and the last (in Lahore) in 1958, and these were buttressed by 
scores of national and regional gatherings. A research and publications program, initially intended 
simply to facilitate better informed conference discussions, evolved into an on-going effort eventually 
responsible for some sixteen hundred scholarly and popular publications as well as several respected 
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scholarly journals, an achievement of major significance in light of the limited amount of serious ma-
terial on the region then available. In the course of all this, a remarkable number of individual partici-
pants and staff gained the knowledge needed to build the era’s developing academic studies programs. 
In sum, the Institute became a highly significant organization both as regards its own programs and 
concerns and as a fountainhead for other similarly concerned groups.
This being so, how is it that so few people in today’s world appear to have even heard of the Institute 
and that there are so few contemporary references to it even in scholarly literature on the Asian-Pacific 
region? The answer to this question almost certainly lies in a combination of post WWII global power 
shifts and the rise of McCarthyism in America. While the immediate post-war world was a time of op-
timism about the chances for new, world-wide peaceful arrangements, it soon became a breeding 
ground for new doubts and suspicions, particularly with respect to the Soviet Union. The reasonably 
warm Soviet-Euro-American war years rapidly faded as the Soviets embarked upon what amounted to 
the colonization of eastern Europe and the transformation of their military into a nuclear-equipped 
force capable of global warfare, in the process changing from a wartime ally against the Nazis into a to-
talitarian threat to democracies everywhere. China, long considered a special friend by most Ameri-
cans, came under the control of Mao’s communists and became a bitter American foe, while newly 
communist North Korea engaged in open warfare in an attempt to unify the Korean peninsula under 
its rule. As the Alger Hiss case and related events further demonstrated, Soviet-sponsored efforts to 
undermine the governments of America and its European allies became an undeniable reality. In 
short, at least so far as many Americans were concerned, the world had suddenly shifted and they 
wanted an explanation. McCarthyism responded that all these developments were the result of a vast 
communist conspiracy throughout the world. Despite its often reckless charges, tendency to declare 
guilt simply by association, and frequent bullying of opponents, many, both outside and inside govern-
mental circles, found McCarthyism’s answer persuasive, and the movement rapidly became a major 
factor in American socio-political life.
Given its now substantial reputation as a well-informed source of information on Pacific regional is-
sues, it is no surprise that the Institute came to the attention of McCarthy and his allies. In fact, the 
roots of this connection pre-date McCarthyism. It began with a heated wartime conflict between the 
United China Relief program, in which Institute Secretary General Edward O. Carter served as its pro-
gram committee chair in addition to his regular duties with the IPR, and Alfred Kohlberg, an import-
ant figure in a different Chinese aid program as well as a participant in Institute activities. Kohlberg 
charged that the Institute was promoting activities that favored Mao’s communists and hampered Chi-
ang’s nationalists. A contentious dispute arose which continued into the post-war period, and became 
a significant factor in McCarthy’s activities after Kohlberg gave him̶or so it appears̶a collection of 
accusatory documents on Institute activities that his group had been assembling since the start of the 
dispute.
Growing public support, mounting evidence of questionable governmental decisions, and the de-
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tailed confessions of former communists like Whittaker Chambers and Elizabeth Bentley, generated 
enough concern that American leaders were compelled to take the issue seriously, and the host of an-
ti-communist internal security measures now central to the definition of McCarthyism were initiated. 
With respect to the Institute, the main impact of this new emphasis was a number of legislative com-
mittee hearings concerning its various activities which culminated in the highly publicized 1951‒52 
hearings conducted by Senator Patrick McCarran’s Subcommittee on Internal Security.
These hearings raised what proved to be a fatal series of doubts, some legitimate and others not, 
about the Institute. Most sensational among these were charges that Institute activities were responsi-
ble for the “loss of China” and that Institute official Owen Lattimore was the Soviet Union’s principal 
agent in the United States. While it goes almost without saying that charges of this nature were border-
line ludicrous, the Institute and many of its supporters felt they nonetheless had to vigorously dispute 
them. However, the sensational nature of these claims within the increasingly tense Cold War atmo-
sphere generated publicity and sentiment that overwhelmed everything the Institute and its supporters 
could produce in response. As a consequence, the McCarran report became central to most of what 
has since been written about the American branch of the Institute and, given the central role of the 
Americans in the Institute’s overall activities, created what became the generally negative impression 
of the entire organization. Several more recent examples of this continuing portrayal are Ann Coulter’s 
Treason (2003) and Stanton Evan’s Blacklisted by History (2008). A small number of contemporary 
scholars, primarily from Japan and the United States, have continued to make the case for the Insti-
tute’s essential innocence in all but the most minor of instances, but their articles and occasional books 
have attracted little interest from publishers and thus have reached only a small audience.
The goal of defending the Institute and returning it to a more appropriate place in Asian-Pacific his-
tory was further complicated in the mid-1990s when the Venona Project, a long secret WWII Ameri-
can program involving the interception and decoding of Soviet messages concerning its espionage ac-
tivities, was declassified. Once the details became public, it became evident that a number of mid-level 
Institute participants had held decidedly pro-Soviet views and that some of them had been actual 
agents, complete with code names. While the Venona Project involved far more activities than just 
those of the Institute̶among other things, it also strengthened the evidence against Alger Hiss and 
Julius Rosenberg̶it made any general defense of the organization considerably more difficult. Fur-
ther, although it established little evidence of actual espionage on the part of Institute-related individu-
als, still other investigations undertaken elsewhere did. The most prominent example in this regard in-
volved Hotsume Ozaki, a respected Japanese Council participant who was found to be part of the 
Sorge spying operation in wartime Japan and was executed. In the United States two important Chi-
nese staff members who served in the Institute’s New York headquarters̶Chen Han-seng and Ch’i 
Ch’ao-ting̶were later found to have been secret members of the Chinese communist party through-
out their years of Institute service. Fred Field, an American from the prominent Vanderbilt family, was 
both an important Institute official and an open advocate on behalf of numerous communist causes, 
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activities that led to his brief but well publicized imprisonment. Further, no one knows what may still 
remain buried in various archival collections. While none of these findings was sufficient to demon-
strate that any Institute official ever undertook an act of espionage or that the organization was a front 
for communist machinations as McCarthy and his supporters believed, taken together they were suffi-
ciently damning to cause the foundations and businesses that had long underwritten the group’s fund-
ing to cease their support. The same is true for many of its individual participants, and the Institute 
was dissolved at the end of the decade.
All of these things have reduced the telling of the Institute’s genuine story to an occasional item in 
academic research and even then usually as only an appendix to a larger discussion of Cold War ten-
sions, McCarthyism, transcultural education, or similar topics. The few subsequent attempts to tell the 
group’s larger and more accurate story have failed to attract publishers. Regrettably but understand-
able, this is not surprising. The McCarran-influenced view has prevailed and, given the Institute’s own 
somewhat troubled record, there is little interest in what a small group of contemporary academics be-
lieve is a more appropriate view.
This is not, however, to suggest that there is no point in further scholarly research on the Institute. 
Thanks in good part to the efforts of Waseda University Professor Michio Yamaoka, the activities of 
the American and Japanese IPR Councils have been explored in numerous conference presentations, 
articles, and a few books, but the records of the other national councils are largely unknown and de-
serve more attention. The activities of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, which had an im-
portant relationship with those Institute councils in the Commonwealth countries, also should receive 
greater attention. A biographical sketch̶or even a full biography̶of Institute Secretary General Ed-
ward O. Carter should be undertaken and the same goes for several other prominent Institute leaders. 
The organization’s record with respect to transcultural and gender issues may provide fruitful areas of 
application for more recently developed behavioral methodologies. Finally, the tendency to link the In-
stitute’s general collapse with McCarthyism and the collapse of the Americans Council probably 
should be questioned as the American unit was just one of over a dozen that composed the full organi-
zation. However, given the central role of the Americans in providing facilities, funding, staffing, and 
leadership, any change in the basic story as currently told will be difficult. In sum, while matters in 
need of further study remain, dreams of a new, stand-alone study returning the Institute to its earlier 
glory probably should be put aside. Any full discussion of the group’s demise is, of historical necessity, 
too cloudy for that purpose. Thus there seems little likelihood of any new study on this now dated 
group, favorable or otherwise, ever appearing in bookshops or on library shelves. If so, a still fascinat-
ing and important story seems destined never to be fully and properly told.
